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Abstract. This paper aims to formulate a new PPP project public-participation mechanism that uses “public satisfaction” as 
a direct influencing factor in conjunction with the public-private benefit model to achieve a substantial response from pro-
ject stakeholders regarding public satisfaction and ensure the transparency of PPP project operation. The proposed model, 
combined public satisfaction assessment with the principal-agent model, investigates the influence of public satisfaction 
on investors’ efforts and the benefit or risk distribution between the government and private investors. The results show 
that the public’s satisfaction level with the project directly affects the proportion of public and private income distribution, 
which provides a way for the public to directly play a substantive and positive role in PPP projects to guarantee public 
benefits and the smooth implementation. The increase in the public satisfaction evaluation of either the government or the 
investors, helps improve the overall effectiveness of PPP projects.
Keywords: public-private partnership projects, public participation, principal-agent theory, risk distribution, benefit analy-
sis, project utility.
Introduction
The original intention of the government in promoting 
public-private partnership (PPP) schemes is to provide 
better public services and products for the public (Cui 
et al., 2018). As the ultimate consumers, the public’s vi-
tal interests are directly related to the performance of the 
projects (Percoco, 2014). However, due to different goals 
and information asymmetry between the government and 
private investors, investors may engage in opportunistic 
behaviour to pursue self-interests, which harms projects 
and even results in group events (Liu et  al., 2016). For 
instance, in 2014, the tap water of Lanzhou City in China 
was reported to have excessive benzene content, which 
was widely and strongly protested by the public. Then, 
Veolia, the investor in this PPP project, was questioned 
about the pollution. Likewise, in 2016, the waste incin-
eration and power generation project in Tianjin City, was 
suspected of falsifying its environmental impact assess-
ment (EIA). This event triggered a confrontation between 
the public and the construction party, seriously damaging 
the project. The occurrence of these incidents has not only 
aroused the public’s doubts about PPP arrangements but 
also caused severe adverse social effects and undermined 
the government’s credibility. By nature, one important rea-
son for most project failures is that the project conflicts 
with the public interests (Xie et al., 2017).
From a theoretical perspective, since the public at-
tributes of PPP products or services are non-competitive 
and non-exclusive and are mainly dictated by the govern-
ment, PPP projects cannot be regulated through effective 
market mechanisms, resulting in “market failure”. On the 
other hand, all governments bear the duty to supervise 
and manage PPP projects, while the roles of equity invest-
ment and supervision conflict exactly. Additionally, the 
over-indebtedness and limited resources of the govern-
ment lead to “government failure”. Consequently, public 
participation in the decision making and implementation 
of PPP projects is critical (Tam et al., 2009). More impor-
tantly, with the continuous development of global politi-
cal democratization, the public has the right to participate 
in public management activities (Tam et al., 2009), thus 
improving the transparency of PPP projects to further 
supervise and constrain the behaviours of both the gov-
ernment and investors. Currently, the public has become 
an indispensable part of national governance, especially in 
project governance.
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Public participation refers to a range of activities that 
solicit citizen input on decision making among the elected 
leaders and on decision making among public administra-
tors (Boyer et al., 2016). Different governments have vari-
ous ways to encourage the public to participate in projects, 
such as public hearings (Kathlene & Martin, 1991), citizen 
panels, public meetings (Levine et  al., 2005), and web-
based forums (Brabham, 2010) etc. However, the public’s 
rights are mainly limited to supervision, which overlaps 
to a large degree with the government’s supervisory re-
sponsibility. In addition, the power of public participation 
in the project is finite, and the public’s satisfaction can 
neither affect the revenues of governments and investors 
nor policy making (Laurian & Shaw, 2008; Li et al., 2012). 
That is, public satisfaction opinions are generally uncov-
ered through questionnaires and are only an auxiliary 
means for the government to supervise projects but do 
not directly affect the improvement of public interests and 
social benefits. But fortunately, the evaluation methods of 
public satisfaction in PPP projects are mature nowadays. 
To prevent market failure and government failure, a rea-
sonable and effective public participation mechanism for 
PPP projects must be formulated, substantially achieving 
public satisfaction and further affecting the decision mak-
ing of both the government and private investors.
The essence of PPP schemes is the principal-agent re-
lationship formed between the government and private 
investors. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to de-
velop incentives to analyse the distribution of risks and 
benefits based on public satisfaction using principal-agent 
theory to inspire private investors to expend a great deal 
of efforts on cooperation. The findings will contribute new 
insights to the incentive mechanism and help to improve 
project governance efficiently in PPP projects. The rest of 
this paper is organized as follows. First, an overview of 
the previous research work in public participation in PPP 
projects is presented. Then, the model concerning the util-
ity functions of the government and investors based on 
public satisfaction is constructed, followed by an optimal 
solution. Next, the results from this model are discussed. 
Specifically, a numerical simulation is illustrated, and the 
results of this simulation are examined to analyse the 
theoretical application of this model. Finally, the research 
closes by drawing certain conclusions.
1. Literature review
As the final recipients of public goods and services, the 
public is a third party, in addition to the public and private 
parties, which cannot be ignored (Torvinen & Ulkuniemi, 
2016). Their attitudes and behaviours greatly affect the per-
formance of PPP projects and should be paid full attention 
(Quick & Feldman, 2011). Due to the neglect of the public 
participation mechanism in some PPP projects, a series of 
social contradictions and conflicts occurred in the subse-
quent operation process (Huang et al., 2015). These events 
not only aroused public disputes to PPP schemes, but also 
caused serious adverse social impact and damaged to the 
government’s credibility (Lang & Xu, 2013). Studies have 
shown that by increasing the public’s awareness and scope 
of participation in PPP projects, optimizing and improv-
ing participation channels, and providing participation 
process guarantees, participation responsiveness, account-
ability mechanisms and support systems, the public’s sense 
of identity with and responsibility for project planning can 
be enhanced to further improve the public’s satisfaction 
with PPP projects (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2011; Kikuchi & 
Gerardo, 2009; Teo & Loosemore, 2014).
At present, many scholars have designed correspond-
ing participation modes and main objects and also es-
tablished a variety of framework mechanisms for public 
participation according to the different stages and natures 
of PPP projects (Torvinen & Ulkuniemi, 2016; Xie et al., 
2014). For instance, PPP projects are supervised and man-
aged based on laws, mainly through government inspec-
tion and supervision departments in China (Shan & Yai, 
2011). Typically, PPP projects can be divided into six 
stages: project establishment, bidding, design, construc-
tion, operation, and handover. Among these stages, the 
project establishment and operation phases are the two 
stages with high public participation (Xie et al., 2017). In 
the initial stage of PPP projects, the public can ensure that 
their intentions are reflected in project decision making 
by means of public consultation, participation in commu-
nity committees, network media, news media supervision 
and other forms (Neshkova & Guo, 2012); while in the 
operation stage, the public can score project engineering 
service quality, which reflects whether the service price is 
reasonable, to determine the level of public satisfaction 
and then urge relevant institutions to implement improve-
ment measures (Boyer et al., 2016).
However, the mechanism of public participation in 
PPP projects only enables public discourse power to be 
unblocked; the evaluation of public satisfaction with pro-
jects still needs to be further discussed. Xie et al. (2017) 
conducted a systematic evaluation of key performance in-
dicators used to benchmark participation performance in 
public construction projects in South China, then used 
linear and additional performance indexes to assess the 
satisfaction with public participation, and developed a 
public participation performance index of PPP projects. 
Torvinen and Ulkuniemi (2016) took a Finland PPP pro-
ject in school property procurement as an example to es-
tablish a model for an end-user engagement process with-
in innovative public procurement practices. The research 
revealed that the end-user’s value potential not rest only 
with creating individual user value but also with increas-
ing the public service’s social, environmental and political 
value. Boyer et al. (2016) investigated the role and impact 
of public involvement in PPPs in the US transportation 
sector and addressed participatory mechanisms designed 
to ameliorate the public’s engagement with decision mak-
ers around PPPs. The evaluation of public satisfaction re-
garding project implementation indicates the deepening 
and improvement of public participation mechanisms, 
which guarantees the improvement and quantification 
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of public participation under the premise of unimpeded 
public discourse power. The establishment of such public 
satisfaction evaluation index system and the measurement 
of public participation value help to promote the develop-
ment and implementation of guaranteed PPP projects.
From the literature review, it can be concluded that 
existing studies mainly focus on two aspects: one is stand-
ardizing the content and policy recommendations of pub-
lic participation in PPP projects, especially on improving 
the mechanism of public involvement; and the other is the 
evaluation of public participation, including a systematic 
construction of evaluation indicators and the evaluation 
methods for public satisfaction. However, these studies 
fail to provide a method through which the public can 
directly participate in and influence the interests of PPP 
parties to protect public benefits. Based on an evaluation 
results of the public’s satisfaction with PPP projects, this 
paper uses ‘public satisfaction’ as a direct influencing fac-
tor in conjunction with the public-private benefit model. 
The analysis of the direct impact of the public’s satisfaction 
on the risk distribution will provide a way for the public to 
directly play a substantive and positive role to guarantee 
public benefits and the smooth implementation of PPP 
projects.
2. Modelling and solutions
2.1. Principal-agent relationship between the 
government and investors
In the ideal PPP model, the government should pursue 
social public interests as the primary goal. However, on 
account of some performance factors such as attracting in-
vestment and completing indicators, the government may 
ignore public appeals or even make decisions that harm 
public interests (Liu et al., 2016). The private investors are 
assumed to be economic man following the market and 
will spare no effort to expand their own economic benefits 
during the cooperation (Brandts & Schram, 2001; Wang 
et  al., 2018). When negotiating and consulting with the 
government, private investors may engage in rent seek-
ing, concealing information and deceiving the govern-
ment etc. (Wang & Liu, 2015). These investors are also 
motivated to reduce the cost of the operation and mainte-
nance, thus damaging public interests and causing public 
losses (Lohmann & Rötzel, 2014). Therefore, as the public 
uses and finances projects, there is no doubt about the 
importance of public participation in PPP projects. To im-
plement the right of public discourse and protect public 
interests in PPP projects, the level of public satisfaction 
with the project is considered in the income distribution 
model of public and private parties.
To investigate the returns of both the government and 
investors in PPP projects, the cooperative relationship be-
tween the two parties should be clarified first. Due to in-
formation asymmetry, the government cannot determine 
whether investors have chosen a great deal of efforts as 
the best strategy for their cooperation (Ni, 2012). Such in-
formation asymmetry leads to distrust between two sides 
and moral hazard. During the early operation stage of 
PPP projects, since investors are faced with the dilemma 
of high input cost and slow income growth, the govern-
ment usually provides income guarantees (Buyukyoran & 
Gundes, 2018). Even if the investors may reduce the cost 
and market income, they still obtain stable income that 
is not less than that guaranteed by the government. Such 
speculation increases the proportion of government funds 
invested in a project, which is undoubtedly a waste of fi-
nancial resources (Wang et al., 2018).
Principal-agent theory is often used to address the in-
come distribution issue in the scenario with asymmetric 
information, which regards organizational management 
as how the principal can effectively motivate the agent to 
make the optimal action selection strategy (Guo & Wang, 
2011; Ma & Zhang, 2014). By observing the agent’s ac-
tions, external random factors and other information, 
the principal designs an appropriate income distribution 
mechanism to motivate the agent to implement the most 
favourable behaviour for the principal from the perspec-
tive of the agent’s interests (Shrestha et al., 2013). In PPP 
projects, the government entrusts private investors to con-
struct and operate the project through the franchise agree-
ment, and then reclaims the project for free at the end 
of the franchise period (Keers & van Fenema, 2018). The 
project quality indeed not only affects the public’s evalua-
tion and satisfaction during the franchise period, but also 
directly determines the government’s operation cost after 
the transfer (Robinson & Scott, 2009). The government, as 
the owner of the projects, perform a supervisory role as 
a principal; private investors, as the project executor, are 
held responsible for the implementation of the project and 
act as an agent (Muller & Turner, 2005).
2.2. Risk distribution and benefit analysis of PPP 
projects based on public participation
When participating in PPP projects, the public can score 
their satisfaction with the government and private inves-
tors (Boyer et al., 2016). Since the public is interested in 
the extent to which the social benefits of the projects are 
achieved, their evaluation of the projects affects incomes 
of both parties. Based on principal-agent theory, risk 
distribution model with public satisfaction assessment 
between the government and investors is constructed. 
Through model analysis, the impact of public satisfaction 
on investors’ efforts, the benefit or risk distribution be-
tween the government and project operators, social ben-
efits and other factors are investigated.
Assumption 1: Referring to the traditional H-M 
model with incentive mechanism (Holmstrom & Mil-
grom, 1987), private investors (i.e., the agent) pay effort a 
to produce πr, which is simultaneously affected by a ran-
dom factor θ. The factor θ obeys the normal distribution 
with zero mean and a variance σ2, i.e., θ ~ N(0, σ2). The 
actual production of the investors (πr) can be expressed 
as follows:
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r aπ = + θ . (1)




c a ba= , (2)
where: b is the effort cost coefficient and b > 0.
Assumption 3: In order to encourage investors to 
participate in PPP projects, the government appropriately 
shares part of the income risk (Wang et al., 2018). Taking 
the transportation PPP project as an example, the expect-
ed return (πe) to the investors is composed of the expected 
traffic volume (Qe) multiplied by the average passage fee 
(P0) of each vehicle, i.e., 0e eQ Pπ = × . When the actual in-
come of the projects (πr) is lower than the average income 
of the industry, the government and investors jointly bear 
the market risk faced by the projects; that is, the govern-
ment provides investors with certain guarantees (Hawas & 
Cifuentes, 2017). In this scenario, the difference between 
the expected return and the actual return is (πe – πr). For 
investors, the portion of the government’s guarantee is the 
option value received (Kim et al., 2011). Similarly, the gov-
ernment does not bear all the income risks of the projects, 
so the option value acquired by the government is the part 
of the risk value assumed by the investors (Wang & Liu, 
2015). Therefore, the option value obtained by the govern-
ments in the risk allocation is:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 01 1e r eE p p Q P a= − × π − π = − × × − , (3)
where: p represents the risk-sharing proportion of the gov-
ernment. Accordingly, investors’ risk-sharing ratio is 1 – p. 
The income of investors can be divided into two parts: the 
actual income obtained through their own efforts (πr) and 
the value of the government guarantees ( )e rp× π − π . Then, 
the value obtained by the investors in PPP projects is:
( ) ( ) ( ) 22 0
1
2r e r e
E p c a a p Q P a ba= π + × π − π − = + × − − .
(4)
Assumption 4: The government and investors can 
perceive each other’s income gap, and this part of the dif-
ference impacts their utilities based on a public satisfac-
tion evaluation. The utility functions of them are restricted 
by two factors: the public satisfaction evaluation and the 
responsibility of both parties to take risks. Typically, the 
public satisfaction factor has a cross-impact on the utilities 
of both parties, that is, the government’s public satisfaction 
factor impacts investors’ utility, while investors’ public sat-
isfaction factor affects the government’s utility. On the one 
hand, the public satisfaction factor cross-functions in the 
utility functions to prevent the government or investors 
from using speculative means to obtain public satisfaction, 
thus interfering with the fairness of the evaluation results. 
On the other hand, the evaluation of public satisfaction 
with investors reflects the realization quality of the social 
benefits of PPP projects, and that with government affects 
the employed incentive measures for investors. Therefore, 
the public satisfaction factors act on two utility functions 
of both sides.
In the principal-agent model, the actual benefits to the 
principal and the agent are determined by the perception of 
fair risk distribution (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Tang & Wang, 
2013). When investors acquire more value from the option 
than the government, i.e., ( ) (1 ) ( )e er rp p× π − π > − × π − π , 
the government assumes more project risks. According 
to the risk allocation principle that the party bearing a 
higher level of risks should also earn more project income 
(Ashuri et al., 2012), the option value difference between 
the investors and the government has an incremental util-
ity on the utility function of the government. Along with 
the improvement of the public’s satisfaction with investors, 
the added value also increases, which means that more 
risks assumed by the government can effectively improve 
the social benefits. In addition, for investors, the weak 
risk appetite may bring them a higher option value, but 
will have a negative effect on their utility function. With 
the improvement of the public’s satisfaction evaluation of 
the government, the benefit reduction effect gradually in-
creases. Therefore, the incentive mechanisms of the gov-
ernment and investors designed is reflected in the imple-
mentation of the public participation results in the risk 
or income distribution, thus guiding the relevant parties 
to pay more attention to the public evaluation. Addition-
ally, the two parties should be encouraged to share project 
risks actively. Only when both of them have a strong will-
ingness to cooperate will they be likely to maximize the 
economic and social benefits.
Based on the above analysis, the utility of the govern-
ment and investors can be inferred respectively as follows:
( )( )







U p Q P a
p Q P a p Q P a
= − × − +
 δ × − − − × −   (5)
( )









U a p Q P a ba
p Q P a p Q P a
= + × − − +
 δ − × − − × − 
 (6)
where: δ1 and δ2 are the public’s satisfaction evaluation of 
the government and the investors, respectively, 1 0,1δ ∈    
and 2 0,1δ ∈   . When the values of δ1 and δ2 are equal to 
0, the public does not participate in a satisfaction assess-
ment of either side.
In summary, the definitions of these relevant param-
eters are as follows in Table 1.
The government, as the principal of PPP projects, 
designs the risk distribution policy (p) based on public 
participation; in this scenario, private investors then de-
termine the expanded level of efforts (a). Generally, the 
primary purpose of PPP schemes is to provide the pub-
lic utility and infrastructure, and thus, the utility of the 
government should be maximized first. For investors, the 
efforts (a) are made based on the maximization of their 
own profits. Consequently, the principal-agent model can 
be designed as follows:
( )( )









p Q P a
U
p Q P a p Q P a
 − × − + =   δ × − − − × −  
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 2020, 24(4): 215–225 219
( )
( )( ) ( )
2
2 0






U a p Q P a ba
p Q P a p Q P a x
= + × − − +
 δ − × − − × − ≥ 
 s.t. (IR)
( )









U a p Q P a ba
p Q P a p Q P a
= + × − − +
 δ − × − − × − 
 s.t. (IC)
1 1* (2 1) 1pa
b
δ − + − δ
= , s.t. (IC’)
where: x0 represents the reservation utility that is the 
maximum expected utility obtained under other market 
opportunities. (IR) refers to the participation constraint of 
investors, implying that the expected utility U2 under the 
PPP contract is no less than the reservation utility x0. (IC) 
is the set of incentive compatibility constraint to maximize 
self-interests. And (IC’) is the first-order equivalent con-
dition of (IC), signifying the optimal and the maximum 
efforts invested by private investors as a given risk distri-
bution policy provided by the government. As a result, the 
optimal guarantee ratio *p  and investors’ optimal effort 






2 2 2 1
eQ Pa
b




( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
2 0 1 1 2*
1 2
2 1 1 2 1 1
2 2 1 2 1
eb Q Pp
δ − × × + δ − + δ − δ −
=
δ − δ −
. (8)
3. Model analysis and discussions
In PPP projects with public participation proposed above, 
the government’s incentive effects on investors (i.e. *a ) is 
positively related to the public’s evaluation of the govern-
ment (δ1). However, in current practice, the results of pub-
lic satisfaction evaluations regarding the project mostly 
come from evaluations of the convenience and comfort 
of the project use etc., so there is a case that the public 
only conducts unilateral evaluations of the government 
or investors. Many PPP projects lack public participation 
mechanisms; that is, the public does not participate in the 
construction, completion and use of the project. In order 
to compare the incentive effects of the risk sharing mech-
anism provided by the government on investors, some 
special scenarios are discussed. When the public does not 
participate in PPP project supervision and evaluation, 







= . When investors receive a large 
number of public evaluations, that is, 2 1δ = , regardless of 
the government’s chosen system (e.g., 1 0δ =  and 1 1δ = ), 












= . To achieve greater cooperation, the 
government must set an appropriate restraint mechanism. 
As the manager, the government cannot expect investors 
to show spontaneous goodwill. Instead, the government 
should create the necessary internal and external en-
vironments to advance cooperation. When the public’s 
evaluation of investors is high and does not participate 
in the supervision of the government, the investors’ so-
cial responsibility is greater. In contrast, when the public 
only participates in government supervision and does not 
evaluate the performance level of the investors, the gov-
ernment assumes greater social responsibility.
Based on the influence of the public satisfaction with 
the government and investors on their behaviours, the 
effect of public evaluation on the investors’ chosen level 
of efforts, the amount of risk distribution and the utility 
function are analysed as follows.
Proposition 1: The amount of risk-taking by the gov-
ernment does not always increase with the improvement 
of the public evaluation. When cooperating with willing 
investors, the government’s the rate of risk taking is closely 
related to the public satisfaction. Moreover, the risk ra-
tio taken by the government improves with the increased 



























. The proportion of 
Table 1. The definitions of the variables
Symbols Definitions
a The efforts expended by the investors
b (b > 0) The cost coefficient for efforts expended by the investors
c(a) The effort cost of the investors expended during the operation stage
θ (θ ~ N(0, σ2) A random variable of a normal distribution
πr The actual revenue of the investors
πe The estimated revenue of the investors
Qe The expected traffic volume
P0 The average passage fee for each vehicle
p The government’s risk-sharing proportion
E1
The option value obtained by the 
government
E2 The option value obtained by the investors
δ1 (δ1 ∈ [0,1])
The public’s satisfaction evaluation of the 
government
δ2 (δ2 ∈ [0,1])
The public’s satisfaction evaluation of the 
investors
U1
Government utility based on the public’s 
satisfaction evaluation
U2
Investor utility based on the public’s 
satisfaction evaluation
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risk allocation is negatively correlated with the govern-
ment’s public evaluation. For different values of ebπ , the 
relationships of the proportion of risk allocation and pub-
lic evaluation between the government and investors are 
shown in Figures 1 to 3.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship among *p , δ1 and δ2. 
A higher expected return on investment (πe) means that 
the government may need to provide a higher guarantee 
value, which reflects poorly on the government. There-
fore, an increase in the government’s public evaluation 
is accompanied by higher risks that investors must bear. 
However, there are two unique areas in the figure: when 
1 (0.5,1)δ ∈  and 2 (0,0.5)δ ∈ , and when 1 (0,0.5)δ ∈  and 
2 (0.5,1)δ ∈ , the government’s risk ratios are 1 and 0, re-
spectively. When working with an investor with a lower 
public satisfaction rating, the government establishes an 
attractive guarantee system to effectively improve service 
quality. In contrast, investors are eager to participate in the 
government’s projects, even when the government’s public 
evaluation rating is low. To obtain a higher expected in-
come, investors opt for high risks.
When 1
2e





. Thus, the proportion of risk 
allocation is not affected by the government’s public evalu-
ation. As shown in Figure 2, when the investors’ estab-
lished income value or cost is constant, the government’s 
public evaluation no longer affects the risk allocation ratio. 









; i.e., when 1
2e b
π < , the 
expected income of investors (πe) is controlled within the 
acceptable range of the government, so investors generally 
have a strong willingness to cooperate with the govern-
ment to complete the project construction. As the govern-
ment notices the increase in investors’ public evaluations, 
the government’s eagerness to collaborate becomes appar-
ent. In this case, based on the public evaluation, the gov-
ernment expresses a desire to bear more risks in response 
to investors’ goodwill. Figure 3 demonstrates the relation-
ship among *p , δ1 and δ2 when 
1
2e
bπ < . As mentioned 
above, when investors express a willingness to cooperate, 
the government appropriately rewards them; that is, when 
the public evaluation rating of the government increases, 
so does the amount of the guarantee provided to the in-
vestors.
Taken altogether, the government should establish a 
flexible incentive mechanism when cooperating with dif-
ferent types of investors. In the traditional determination 
of the risk allocation ratio for PPP projects, both the gov-
ernment and investors should pay more attention to inves-
tors’ earning capacity, project market conditions and other 
factors, while ignore the importance of public evaluation 
on the impact of the allocation ratio. For the government, 
to achieve the best incentive effect and effectively promote 
the smooth development of PPP projects, timely designing 
attractive incentive policies combined with public satisfac-
tion evaluations is essential. In terms of investors to obtain 
high returns in PPP projects, they need to perform a good 
job and achieve a high satisfaction rating from the public. 
And this process of expending efforts will also bring in-
creased social benefits.
Proposition 2: The effort level of investors that is ex-
pended during project cooperation does not always in-



























































Figure 1. When 
1
2e
bπ > , the relationship between *p  and 
δ1, δ2
Figure 2. When 1
2e
bπ = , the relationship between *p  and 
δ1, δ2
Figure 3. When 1
2e
bπ < , the relationship between *p  and 
δ1, δ2
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(Figure 4). To identify effective incentives, blindly improv-
ing the intensity of rewards and punishments is not a wise 
choice for different investors. When the public evaluation 
of investors is low, the government can increase the in-
tensity of the rewards and punishments to improve inves-
tors’ efforts. When investors’ public satisfaction rating is 
high, setting up a strict punishment system is likely to di-
minish investors’ enthusiasm, resulting in reduced efforts 
conversely. Investors with high public evaluations expend 
greater efforts under the government’s high reward system.
Both the government and the public expect investors 
to invest great efforts in PPP projects. It should be noted 
that the efforts of investors are affected by the public’s sat-
isfaction with the government and investors. The govern-
ment should ensure the performance of their duties and 
obtain the public’s recognition of its work first. On this 
basis, as the public’s satisfaction with the service quality 
increases, the efforts of the investors also improve.
Proposition 3: An increase in the public evaluation 
of the government and investors does not always increase 
their utility values, and the utility effects of δ1 and δ2 are 
similar. When the government achieves a high public level 
satisfaction and the investors’ public evaluation level is 
low, the government prefers to sacrifice their own ben-
efits to punish non-cooperative behaviours. As displayed 
in Figure 5, when 1 (0.5,1)δ ∈  and 2 (0,0.5)δ ∈ , the prin-
cipal’s utility is close to 0. In the case of investors, when δ1 
and δ2 are in the interval (0, 0.5), the government’s public 
evaluation is fixed, and the investors’ utility improves with 
the increase in their public evaluation. If the public evalu-
ation of investors is fixed, the utility improves with the 
decline in the government’s public evaluation. When the 
public satisfaction with investors is high, utility increases 
with the increase in the government’s public evaluation.
Public satisfaction with PPP projects is affected by 
many factors, such as project service quality, operation 
and management level, service price and public income 
level. If the public is satisfied with the project, their trust 
in the project will increase, and project efficiency im-
proves eventually. However, it is important to note that the 
improvement in public satisfaction is for both government 
departments and investors, and a large gap between the 
two adversely affects the realization of the social benefits 
of the project.
From Figure 6, the lowest point of investors’ utility 
value is 1 1δ = , 2 0δ = , and 1 0δ = , 2 1δ = , which means 
that a collaboration is unlikely to be successful if only the 
principal or the agent receives high public evaluations. 
This part of the simulation is a supplement to Proposi-
tion 1. If the public only participates in the evaluation of 
the satisfaction of the government or investors, this can 
easily lead to incomplete evaluation conclusions, affecting 
reliability. In other words, if the public is only satisfied 
with the work of the government but completely unsat-
isfied with the work of the investors, or if the public is 
completely satisfied with the efforts of the investors but 
dissatisfied with the government’s efforts, this affects the 
smooth progress of the project, resulting in zero project 
benefits. Therefore, this part of the conclusion once again 
emphasises the importance of the cooperative efforts be-
tween the government and investors. Only when the pub-
lic’s evaluation of both sides reaches a balanced range can 
it be beneficial to maximize the social and economic ben-
efits of PPP projects.
4. Numerical example
To describe the model more intuitively and verify its effec-
tiveness, the relevant parameters are assigned as shown in 
Table 1. The expected income and the cost coefficient have 
direct impacts on the risk-sharing rate, investors’ efforts 
and mutual income. Therefore, the assignment for bπe is 
divided into two categories: one product of bπe is greater 
than 0.5 and the other is less than 0.5.
When the public evaluation of investors is fixed, 
the influence of the government’s public satisfaction 
Figure 4. The relationship between *a  and δ1, δ2 Figure 5. The relationship between *1U  and δ1, δ2
Figure 6. The relationship between *2U  and δ1, δ2
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rating on the parameters is examined. The scenario 1 
shows that the government considers investors’ evalua-
tion scores to be too low to cooperate when the public 
evaluation of investors is 0.2. Thus, the government in-
creases the penalty for investors, which increases their 
own evaluation result (i.e., from 0.1 to 0.4). The effort of 
investors (from a negative value to 0.37) improves under 
the penalty mechanism.
From scenario 2, when the public evaluation of inves-
tors is far higher than that of the government, investors 
assume all the project’s risks. Although the increase in the 
government’s public evaluation rating (from 0.1 to 0.4) 
increases the utility value of investors, it does not encour-
age investors to expand their efforts or even reverses the 
impact (from 0.63 to 0.53) because, in the case of investors 
taking all the risks, with the increase in government guar-
antees, investors obtain the same return and improve their 
own benefits with minimal efforts. However, it is grati-
fying that although the efforts of investors decrease, the 
incomes of both parties and overall project improve. With 
the increased public satisfaction rating of the government, 
the overall income of the project grows from 0.54 to 0.67. 
Consequently, when working with investors with good 
public evaluations, an increase in the government’s public 
satisfaction helps improve the project’s income.
Based on a comparison of the data in scenarios 3 and 
4, when the government’s satisfaction rating is high (e.g., 
0.8), the relative risk to borne by the government is also 
high, or the government assumes full responsibility for the 
project’s risks. Investors’ efforts do not always reflect their 
public evaluations. When the government’s public evalu-
ation is low (e.g., 0.2), investors’ efforts decrease (from 
0.16 to –0.04) with the increase in their evaluation score 
(from 0.1 to 0.4) because the increase in the investors’ 
public evaluation is sensitive to the government’s rewards 
and punishments. Moreover, when investors find that the 
government’s rewards and punishments are weak, they feel 
dissatisfied and then reduce their efforts. It is worth not-
ing that a high public evaluation of the government does 
not yield high benefits to the government or the project. 
Compared to scenario 4, the utility value of the govern-
ment and project in scenario 3 is higher, which suggests 
that the government’s high incentive policy may be more 
appealing in the early stages of the project. However, the 
guarantee or risk exceeds the budget, and hence, a high 
incentive policy does not actually yield more benefits for 
the project or the public.
Four unique public evaluations are simulated in sce-
nario 5. When both the government and investors receive 
high public evaluation scores, the overall benefit of the 
Table 2. Numerical simulation
Scenarios b πe δ1 δ2 *p *a U1 U2 U1 + U2
1 1 1 0.10 0.20 0.60 –0.03 0.45 0.57 1
0.20 0.50 0.10 0.45 0.55 1
0.30 0.29 0.23 0.48 0.53 1
0.40 0 0.37 0.51 0.55 1.06
2 1 1 0.10 0.80 0 0.63 0.07 0.47 0.54
0.20 0 0.60 0.08 0.50 0.58
0.30 0 0.57 0.09 0.54 0.62
0.40 0 0.53 0.09 0.58 0.67
3 1 1 0.20 0.10 0.40 0.16 0.49 0.52 1
0.20 0.50 0.10 0.45 0.55 1
0.30 0.71 –0.02 0.43 0.62 1.04
0.40 1 –0.40 0.56 0.64 1.20
4 1 1 0.80 0.10 1 0.84 0.02 0.52 0.54
0.20 1 0.90 0.02 0.52 0.54
0.30 1 1.03 –0.01 0.49 0.49
0.40 1 1.40 –0.16 0.34 0.18
5 1 1 0 0 0.50 0 0.50 0.50 1
0 1 0 0.50 0 0.38 0.38
1 1 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.63 0.88
1 0 1 1 0 0.50 0.50
6 0.5 0.6 0.10 0.70 0 0.60 0 0.42 0.42
0.20 0.04 0.53 0.02 0.40 0.43
0.30 0.13 0.45 0.05 0.40 0.45
0.40 0.38 0.38 0.10 0.41 0.51
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project is the highest. Scenario 6 examines the effect of the 
public evaluation of project participants on the parameters 
when the product of bπe is less than 0.5. When the public 
evaluation of investors is fixed and the government’s pub-
lic satisfaction rating increases, the portion of risk taking 
assumed by the government, the efforts of investors, and 
the change in utility between the government and inves-
tors are all similar to those in scenario 3, excluding the 
project’s income.
By comparing the changes in the project’s benefits us-
ing six scenarios, the closer the public evaluation coef-
ficients of the government and investors are, the higher 
the project’s utility. When selecting private investors, the 
government should examine investors’ public evaluations 
from past projects in which they participated and choose 
the most suitable partner to complete the project. Accord-
ing to the rightmost column in Table 2, the overall utility 
of the project increases with the increase in public satis-
faction with the government or investors in scenarios 1, 
3, 4 and 6.
Conclusions
PPP projects are generally large-scale public infrastructure 
projects that involve not only the distribution of interests 
between the government and private investors but also 
the interests of the public (Tam et  al., 2009). Therefore, 
the performance of PPP projects has a high social effect, 
which is related to the authority and integrity of the gov-
ernment (Huang et  al., 2015). In the absence of public 
participation as a third-party guarantee, it is easy for the 
government and investors to confront each other when 
making decisions: to avoid monopolistic management of 
urban infrastructure, the government wants more control 
over projects, while investors are worried that the govern-
ment will break its promise and ask for a higher guarantee 
(Shan & Yai, 2011). Therefore, the two sides often conduct 
multiple negotiations to resolve differences, which reduces 
the efficiency of cooperation and even leads to the failure 
of the projects and affects the public interests (Xie et al., 
2017).
In PPP projects, a long concession period means pri-
vate investors face changes in various external economic 
environments, such as road flow, interest rate, inflation 
rate and other macroeconomic conditions (Li et al., 2005). 
Taking the PPP transportation project as an example, un-
der the condition of a fixed rate, road flow becomes a risk 
that investors have to face, which has a direct impact on 
their income (de Albornoz & Soliño, 2014). To attract pri-
vate investors to participate in the infrastructure projects 
and guarantee the normal operation and maintenance of 
investors in the presence of market risks, the government 
usually shares the risk with private investors by providing 
guarantees (Wang et al., 2018). Based on the hypothesis 
of the economic man, the investors in PPP projects will 
always focus on their own self-interests rather than public 
benefits. In the absence of a reliable supervision mecha-
nism, the government officials may even engage in “rent-
seeking” behaviours, leading to project corruption and 
further damaging public interests (Takano, 2017). Public 
participation can be an important component of PPP pro-
ject supervision systems and effectively resist project cor-
ruption (Boyer et al., 2016).
Therefore, as one of the stakeholders in PPP projects, 
the public should play a role in the project, and their in-
terests are the starting point for public participation. To 
ensure the effectiveness of public participation in the de-
cision making or implementation of PPP projects, public 
satisfaction evaluations should be included in the income 
or risk allocation model and directly influence the propor-
tion of the income distribution between the government 
and private investors, motivating the private sector to 
pay more attention to project quality and projects. Social 
benefits, thereby increasing the public discourse on PPP 
projects, provide a new incentive path for the government 
to guarantee the social and economic benefits of PPP pro-
jects. In the process of PPP project guarantee option value 
allocation, the project participants’ perceptions of whether 
the distribution result is reasonable is not only based on 
their own risk-taking ability but also on the amount of risk 
assumed by other participants, which affects their level of 
satisfaction. For instance, faced with investors’ low public 
satisfaction ratings, the government needs to increase in-
centives and punishments. In contrast, investors with high 
public satisfaction ratings are discouraged from cooper-
ating if the punishment intensity is too severe. With the 
increase in public satisfaction for either the government 
or the investors, the overall effectiveness of the project is 
improved. However, when the government satisfaction 
rating is high and the investor satisfaction rating is low, 
the project utility value decreases instead. As a result, the 
government’s effective incentive policy means adopting a 
differentiated incentive model for different cooperative 
units. Finally, a limitation should be highlighted. Since 
it is difficult to test the theoretical conclusions by using 
real cases as a result of a lack of data, only a numerical 
simulation is presented. Nevertheless, how to comprehend 
the parameters have been explained, helping to guide both 
governments and private investors to choose the optimal 
strategies in PPP projects.
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